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RESEARCH NOTE 
Host Country Corporate Income Tax Rate and Foreign Subsidiary Survival 
 
ABSTRACT 
Host country tax considerations are critical to multinational enterprise (MNE) foreign direct 
investment decisions, but understudied in international business (IB) research. We address this gap by 
examining the relationship between host country corporate income tax rates (HCCITRs) and foreign 
subsidiary survival. We develop our hypothesis drawing upon location/country-specific advantage theory 
and international tax literature. Our longitudinal sample (1990-2013) comprises 13,468 MNE subsidiaries 
in 78 countries. Results indicate a one standard deviation (7.7%) decrease in HCCITR increases 
subsidiary survival probability (at any given time) by 33%. This effect is stronger compared to several 
well studied explanatory variables in IB survival analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is substantial value in integrating the domains of finance and international business (IB), 
however, there is very little cross-disciplinary research across these fields (Puck & Filatotchev, 2018). A 
case in point is the impact of country corporate income tax rate on domestic firm performance, which is 
commonly studied in finance, accounting, and economics research (e.g., Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). 
However, its effect on multinational enterprise (MNE) foreign direct investment (FDI) in general and 
foreign subsidiary performance outcomes (e.g., survival, profitability) in particular, has been overlooked 
in most of the IB literature. 
Foreign subsidiaries represent substantial resource and equity commitments from MNEs. Hence 
their survival is critical to MNE success and their termination is almost always an “extreme” case (Benito, 
2005). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that examining the determinants of foreign subsidiary survival 
i.e., continuity or termination, has received considerable academic attention.  Much extant literature has 
investigated factors at the MNE level such as  firm size and international experience (e.g., Kim, Lu, & 
Rhee, 2012); at the subsidiary level such as subsidiary size and expatriate staffing (e.g., Gaur, Delios, & 
Singh, 2007); and at the country level such as GDP and cultural distance (e.g., Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 
2001). 
A consistent and surprising omission from most prior foreign subsidiary survival analyses (which 
the authors are also guilty of), is the effect of host country corporate income tax rate (HCCITR). The 
HCCITR matters not just to foreign direct investment (FDI) location choice, but also to decisions 
involving foreign subsidiary survival. As Contractor (2016: 13) notes: “No decision in large multinational 
corporations is made these days without assessing tax implications. The extent to which global 
operations, supply chains, and location decisions are affected by tax considerations—places this issue at 
the heart of global strategy. In large companies, executives consider tax angles concurrently with 
strategy, rather than as an afterthought. [Yet] Vanishingly few international business (IB) and strategy 
papers take taxes into consideration” (italics added).  
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Our review of the MNE tax literature confirms Contractor’s (2016) assertion that, despite the 
importance of taxes in IB decisions, surprisingly few IB papers take taxes into consideration (for 
exceptions see Brajcich, Friesner, & Schibik, 2016; Gokalp, Lee, & Peng, 2017; Jones & Temouri, 2016). 
We reviewed the 100 most recently published empirical papers on FDI by searching abstracts for “foreign 
direct investment” from June 2011 until February 2020 in the 8 most cited IB journals1. Of these, only 4 
papers (i.e., 4%) included a tax variable. Further, we found no empirical research (from the year 2000 to 
date) that examines the relationship between HCCITR and foreign subsidiary survival or uses HCCITR as 
a control variable in subsidiary survival analysis. 
Host country corporate income tax rate (HCCITR) can impact both foreign subsidiary 
location/continuity decisions as well as the level of investment. The former relates to the extensive 
margin, where a lower HCCITR would increase the probability of an MNE establishing/retaining a 
subsidiary in that country. The latter relates to the intensive margin, where a lower HCCITR would 
increase the intensity/level of an MNE’s investment in a foreign subsidiary (e.g., by adding employees, 
increasing equity ownership, and acquiring assets) (Egger & Merlo, 2011).  
HCCITR may impact foreign subsidiary survival for two reasons. First, MNEs may consider 
locating foreign subsidiaries in lower tax countries to reduce taxes paid on host country profits and to 
improve after-tax profits (Christmann, Day, & Yip, 1999). As mentioned above, MNEs are more likely to 
invest in and retain such subsidiaries due to improved profitability from country-specific tax savings. 
Second, as the finance, accounting, and economics literatures inform us, MNEs may also reduce corporate 
tax burdens by shifting profits among subsidiaries in different tax jurisdictions/countries through transfer 
pricing (Lin & Chang, 2010), debt shifting (Schjelderup, 2016), or intangible asset shifting (Dischinger & 
Riedel, 2011). For example, MNEs usually set higher internal transfer prices when exporting products to 
subsidiaries in countries with higher CITRs and set lower internal transfer prices when exporting products 
to subsidiaries in countries with lower CITRs, in order to minimize their overall income tax payables and 
maximize their overall after tax profits (Lin & Chang, 2010). To reduce tax burdens, they also generally 
move debt from subsidiaries located in low tax countries to subsidiaries located in high tax countries; and 
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move intangible royalty generating assets, such as patents and trademarks, from subsidiaries in high tax 
countries to subsidiaries in low tax countries (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Schjelderup, 2016). Hence, 
MNEs may be less likely to terminate an otherwise poorly performing subsidiary in a low CITR host 
country, to maintain profit shifting channels (for example through intangible asset shifting), that enhance 
overall MNE performance.  
Accordingly, this research note investigates the impact and explanatory power of host country 
corporate income tax rate (HCCITR) on foreign subsidiary survival; and makes the following 
contributions. It informs location-specific or country-specific advantages (LSAs/CSAs) theory (Dunning, 
1998, 2000; Rugman, 1981, 2010) by considering how FDI outcomes are impacted by host-country 
specific corporate tax rates. In contrast, extant literature on location based tax advantages is focused on 
the antecedents of “tax-haven” FDI (e.g., Jones & Temouri, 2016; Oxelheim, Randoy, & Stonehill, 2001). 
It demonstrates that accounting for HCCITR is theoretically pertinent and empirically necessary (in IB 
performance/survival analysis research), so that an omitted variable problem is avoided; and the effect of 
other independent variables is not biased, confounded, or inflated (Nielsen & Raswant, 2018). We find 
that the effect of HCCITR on foreign subsidiary survival is not only significant, but also stronger than 
several other explanatory variables such as subsidiary size, MNE size, cultural distance, and host country 
GDP growth that have been consistently used in IB survival analysis research. While our study is 
exploratory, the results provide an important large sample baseline to inform subsequent research on host 
country tax rates and FDI outcomes.   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
The eclectic (OLI) paradigm has long recognized the importance of location-specific advantages 
(LSAs) to MNE FDI, in addition to firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and internalization advantages 
(Dunning, 1998, 2000). LSAs refer to host country or host location factors such as market demand, 
natural resources, human capital, advanced infrastructure, and lower operational costs (that differ among 
countries/locations); and have also been referred to as country-specific advantages (CSAs) (Rugman, 
2010). CSAs/LSAs additionally include government institutions and regulations that favor inward FDI by 
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providing incentives, protecting intellectual property rights, and reducing red-tape (Brouthers, 2002, 
Dunning, 2000). Dunning and Lundan (2008: 585) refer to the latter CSAs/LSAs as “institutionally 
related location advantages of countries”. Lower host country corporate income tax rates (HCCITR) are 
an example of such government institutions/regulations that encourage inward FDI. Oxelheim et al. 
(2001) consider lower HCCITR as finance-specific location advantages. Thus, based on the above, we 
consider lower HCCITR as a finance-related regulatory/institutional CSA (Dunning, 2000; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008; Oxelheim et al., 2001).  
Firms that benefit from CSAs generally improve their economic outcomes and competitive 
advantage (Dunning, 2001). For instance, using a sample of 99 subsidiaries across 37 countries, 
Christmann, Day, and Yip (1999) found that host country characteristics significantly impact foreign 
subsidiary gross margins. Using a much larger sample of nearly 27,000 subsidiaries across 150 countries, 
Makino, Isobe, and Chan (2004) found that host country effects attributable to CSA differentials explain 
5.5% of the variance in subsidiary profit margin.  
There are two key mechanisms through which lower HCCITR can improve a foreign subsidiary’s 
survival likelihood, namely increased focal subsidiary profitability and profit-shifting. We elaborate on 
each of these below. The first involves improvement in a foreign subsidiary’s after tax profitability due to 
lower HCCITR. MNEs are known to locate important economic activities and/or increase investment in 
lower tax countries to benefit from tax savings and thus higher profits. Hence, in recent years, several 
national governments (e.g., the UK, Ireland, and recently the US) have reduced corporate taxes in order to 
stimulate their economies, and attract foreign investments (Semuels, 2016). De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2003) found that a 1% decrease in HCCITR is linked with a 5.7% increase in plant FDI in that host 
country. Clausing (2009) found that a similar reduction in HCCITR increases MNE host country 
employment by 1.6%, sales by 2.9%, assets by 4.8%, gross income by 5.2%, and profitability by 0.5%. 
Thus we can reasonably infer that driven by tangible profitability gains from lower HCCITR, MNEs are 
more likely to invest in (rather than divest) foreign subsidiaries in those host countries, which improves 
subsidiary survival prospects. Research also indicates that while foreign subsidiary profitability and its 
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survival are distinct measures, they are generally correlated (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Makino, Beamish, 
& Zhao, 2004). Hence, we posit that increased profitability from lower HCCITRs increases the possibility 
of investment in a foreign subsidiary and accordingly improves its likelihood of survival.  
The second mechanism entails profit shifting through channels such as, transfer pricing, debt 
shifting, and intangible asset shifting, by which foreign subsidiaries in lower HCCITR countries can help 
MNEs reduce their overall tax burden and improve corporate financial performance. Analyzing MNE 
profit shifting, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) found that a 1% decrease in HCCITR is associated with 
a 0.8% increase in a subsidiary’s pre-tax profits in that host country. They also found that about two 
thirds of profits are shifted through non-financial channels (e.g. transfer pricing) and about one third is 
shifted through financial channels (e.g. debt shifting). Analyzing transfer pricing, Klassen, Lisowsky, and 
Mescall (2017) found that a firm focusing on minimizing taxes through transfer pricing, has an effective 
tax rate that is 6.6 percentage points lower and generates about $43 million more in tax savings, on 
average. Analyzing debt shifting, Desai, Foley, and Hines Jr (2004a) found that internal MNE lending is 
particularly sensitive to country tax rates with lower HCCITR affiliates lending to (and charging interest 
from) subsidiaries in higher tax jurisdictions (a 10% increase in HCCITR is associated with a 2.8% 
increase in debt/asset ratio). Analyzing intangible asset shifting, Dischinger and Riedel (2011) found that 
on average, a 10% decrease in a subsidiary’s HCCITR raises its intangible asset investment (e.g., R&D, 
patents) by about 11%. This suggests that MNEs exploit HCCITR differentials between foreign 
subsidiaries using mechanisms such as transfer pricing, debt shifting, and intangible asset shifting to 
decrease their tax burden and improve corporate profitability. 
Research shows that tax management practices such as the above are, on average, positively 
related to firm value (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Minnick & Noga, 2010). Highlighting the importance 
of tax management, many firms designate their tax departments as profit centers, with goals that 
correspond to decreasing tax liabilities and increasing net corporate income (Robinson, Sikes, & Weaver, 
2010). Moreover, Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) found a relationship between firm profitability 
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and use of “tax shelter” mechanisms. They also showed that the more profitable a firm is, the greater the 
gap between its book and taxable income (their proxy for tax management).  
Two scenarios illustrate how profit shifting to subsidiaries with low HCCITRs benefits MNEs. In 
the transfer pricing scenario, when exporting products to a subsidiary in a country with a relatively lower 
CITR, the transfer price is set at a lower level (Lin & Chang, 2010), which reduces revenues for the 
exporting subsidiary and reduces costs for the importing subsidiary. In the intangible asset shifting 
scenario, an MNE would shift its intangible intellectual property (e.g., patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
brands, licenses, etc.) to a subsidiary with a relatively low HCCITR that charges royalties to other 
operating subsidiaries worldwide (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011). In both cases, doing so shifts profits to the 
focal subsidiary in the low HCCITR country, thus increasing an MNE’s overall tax savings and profits. 
A key reason why companies such as Nestle, Procter & Gamble, and Siemens have low effective 
tax rates is due to their tax-optimized set-up of multinational operations (Avi-Yonah & Lahav, 2012). 
Hence, in making retention/termination decisions, all else being equal, MNEs may be more likely to 
retain subsidiaries in countries with lower CITRs to maintain profit shifting channels that enhance their 
overall corporate performance, even when these subsidiaries are unprofitable or loss-making. As De 
Simone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017) find, all else being equal, MNEs generally shift more profits to 
loss-making subsidiaries than to profitable subsidiaries, since the former behave as temporary low tax rate 
subsidiaries because they can have a marginal tax rate much lower than the statutory HCCITR. By 
retaining such unprofitable or loss-making subsidiaries, MNEs follow a ‘shift-to-loss’ strategy in addition 
to the traditional ‘shift-to-lower tax’ strategy to save taxes and increase actual profits, by reporting lower 
profits in the profitable subsidiaries and smaller losses in the loss-making affiliates (De Simone, et al., 
2017).  
In summary, the above suggests that (lower) HCCITR may be considered a country specific 
advantage (CSA); and that MNEs are more likely to invest in and retain such subsidiaries due to 
improved profitability from country-specific tax savings and use of profit shifting channels to increase 
overall/worldwide corporate profits.  Further, all else being equal, MNEs may be more likely to retain 
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subsidiaries in lower HCCITR countries, even when these subsidiaries are not performing well, to 
maintain profit shifting channels that enhance overall corporate financial performance.  
Hypothesis 1: The lower (higher) a foreign subsidiary’s host country corporate income tax rate 
(HCCITR), the higher (lower) is its likelihood of survival (i.e., the lower (higher) is its likelihood 
of exit). 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
We tested the hypothesis using a large longitudinal sample comprising 13,468 unique foreign 
subsidiaries of 1,712 Japanese MNEs in 78 countries from 1990-2013 (96,060 subsidiary-years or 
observations). Following Desai, Foley, and Hines Jr (2004b), we excluded affiliates in which the Japanese 
parent owned less than 10% equity, since these are usually considered portfolio investments where the 
MNE exercises little strategic or operational influence. Our dataset was compiled from the Toyo Keizai 
(TK) Japanese subsidiary data, NEEDS Japanese parent data, Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) geographic distance data, TaxFoundation.org data, OECD Tax 
data, Ernst and Young (EY) Tax data, Trading Economics Tax data, and economic and governance data 
from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and International Labor Organization (ILO). 
Using the TK and NEEDS databases is appropriate for our study since they provide near population level 
data on Japanese MNEs and their foreign subsidiaries worldwide. 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable. Subsidiary Survival/Exit: Following previous studies on subsidiary 
survival/exit (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004), our dependent variable (DV) is an indicator that takes a value 
of 1 if subsidiary x exits at time t, and 0 if it survives. Observations start in 1990 and continue until an 
exit occurs, or they are right-censored in 2013. For the period 1990-2013 there were 2,924 exits out of 
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13,468 foreign subsidiaries of 1,712 MNE parents and a total of 96,060 observations (i.e. subsidiary-
years). 
Independent variable. Host Country Corporate Income Tax Rate (HCCITR): We collected the 
data on statutory HCCITRs for each of the 78 countries by year between 1990 to 2013 from multiple 
sources. The main source for the HCCITRs was TaxFoundation.org, which provided the CITRs for most 
countries and most years. For missing data, we used tax data available from OECD, Ernst and Young 
(EY), and Trading Economics. We also used these multiple sources to validate the data and ensure 
consistency among the different sources. We did not find discrepancies in the reported statutory CITRs by 
country/year across multiple sources. 
Control variables. We controlled for several variables, which the literature suggests may be 
possible alternative explanations for subsidiary survival/performance. We were guided also by a recent 
meta-analysis of foreign subsidiary performance that identified significant known effects (Bai, Du, & 
Solarino, 2018). First, at the subsidiary level, we controlled for Subsidiary Age, Subsidiary Size, 
Expatriate Number, Subsidiary Diversity, Parent Equity Ownership, and Subsidiary Sector. We controlled 
for Subsidiary Age (Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish, 2013) to account for the possible effects of the 
liability of newness and the ability of older subsidiaries to adapt to host-country conditions on subsidiary 
survival. It was measured as the number of years a subsidiary has operated since its date of establishment. 
We controlled for Subsidiary Size (Demirbag, Apaydin, & Tatoglu, 2011) to account for liabilities of 
smallness and structural inertia. It was measured as the total number of subsidiary employees. Consistent 
with Plourde, Parker, and Schaan (2014) we measured expatriate number as the number of expatriates in 
the subsidiary. In regard to subsidiary diversity, we used Dunning’s (1998) classification to categorize a 
subsidiary’s investment purpose into five categories (i.e., resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, market-
seeking, strategic asset seeking, and other). We then adopted the widely used entropy measure2 to 
compute subsidiary diversity scores for each subsidiary (as per Getachew & Beamish, 2017). Consistent 
with Lu and Hebert (2005) we measured parent equity ownership as the percentage of the focal 
subsidiary’s equity owned by the Japanese MNE with the largest equity in the subsidiary. We controlled 
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for Subsidiary Sector (Tang & Rowe, 2012). We classified subsidiary sector into three groups and 
operationalized it as a categorical variable (manufacturing = 1, trade = 2, and services & others = 3). 
Second, at the parent (MNE) level, consistent with previous research, we controlled for Parent 
Size (Lu & Xu, 2006), Parent Performance (Delios & Makino, 2003), Parent International Experience (Lu 
& Beamish, 2004), and Parent Sector (Gong, 2006). We measured parent size by the number of parent 
employees and measured parent performance as the return on assets of the parent. We operationalized 
parent international experience in a given year as a composite of the count of an MNE’s foreign 
subsidiaries and a count of the number of countries where an MNE had subsidiaries (Lu & Beamish, 
2004). We divided each count by its maximum value in the sample and our composite measure is the 
average of the two ratios. In a similar manner to subsidiary sector, we operationalized parent sector as a 
categorical variable (manufacturing = 1, trade = 2, and services & others = 3).  
Third, at the country level, we controlled for Host Country Size (Chung, Lu, & Beamish, 2008), 
Host Country GDP Growth Rate (Chung et al., 2008), Host Country Inflation Rate (Sayek, 2009), Host 
Country Debt to GDP ratio, Host Country Governance, and Cultural Distance. We measured Host 
Country Size as the host country per capita gross domestic product (GDP per capita in US $); Host 
Country GDP Growth Rate as the percentage change in host country GDP per capita from the prior year 
to the focal year; Host Country Inflation Rate as the annual GDP Deflator (%); and Host Country Debt to 
GDP ratio as a host country’s central government debt expressed as a percentage of its GDP. 
We controlled for Host Country Governance to account for differences in governance systems 
across host countries and its impact on FDI decisions (Esteller-Moré, A., Rizzo, L., & Secomandi, R., 
2020). We measured it using the six World Bank Governance Indicators (WGBIs) i.e., Control of 
Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Voice 
and Accountability, which rank all countries on a scale from 0-100 on each of the six variables. Following 
Hoffman, Munemo, and Watson (2016), we conducted a principal component analysis across the six 
indicators. These six dimensions have been found to be highly inter-correlated and an eigen-value cut-off 
of 1 provided a single principal component. Hence, we averaged the indicators by country to compute a 
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single measure of Host Country Governance. Our dataset spans from 1990 to 2013. However, the WBGIs 
are available starting 1996. Thus, in order to retain data prior to 1996, we followed Feeny and 
McGillivray (2010)  and used the value of the WBGIs for 1996 in years prior to 1996. This is justified on 
the grounds that no other data are available and that the level of governance usually varies very little 
through time (Feeny & McGillivray, 2010).  
We controlled for the effect of Cultural Distance between home and host country on subsidiary 
survival (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009), by using a generalized version of the Kogut and Singh (1988) 
cultural distance index. With Japan as the home (reference) country, we computed a composite measure 
across the four Hofstede dimensions of Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance.  
RESULTS 
We use an extended Cox proportional hazard regression model (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2005) to test 
our hypothesis. Cox regression is commonly used in subsidiary survival/exit analysis (e.g., Gaur & Lu, 
2007; Getachew & Beamish, 2017) and an extended model is appropriate because the covariates are time-
varying. When MNEs have more than one subsidiary, these subsidiary observations are not independent, 
rather they are nested within MNEs. Hence, in our regression, we cluster subsidiaries by MNE to account 
for the number of clusters in the sample and to ensure that a few MNEs do not drive our effects. Such 
clustering creates robust standard errors and makes our claims more generalizable. We standardized all 
predictors to reduce the issue of multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). 
To alleviate potential endogeneity concerns such as omitted variables or measurement errors that 
may be correlated with both HCCITR and subsidiary survival/exit, we also use a two stage least squares 
approach (2SLS) that is applicable to Cox regression (Tchetgen, Walter, Vansteelandt, Martinussen, and 
Glymour, 2014). To implement 2SLS, in the first stage, we regress HCCITR on an instrumental variable 
and all control variables. We then use the predicted (fitted) value of HCCITR from the first stage in the 
second stage Cox regression model. 
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Our instrumental variable is Social Protection Expenditure (SPE) as a percentage of GDP 
(obtained from the ILO). We justify the selection of this instrumental variable as follows. A host country 
with high social protection expenditure is likely to have high corporate income tax rates, but host country 
SPE is unlikely to directly affect foreign subsidiary survival/exit.  This logic aligns with that of Gan & 
Qui (2019), who used a similar variable (Public Social Expenditure to GDP) to instrument for the effect 
of host country tax competitiveness (Debt to GDP ratio) on stock market returns following cross-border 
acquisition announcements.  
While our dataset spans from 1990 to 2013, the SPE data is available starting 1995. As with the 
WGBI data for our Host Country Governance measure, to retain data prior to 1995, we used the value of 
SPE in 1995 for prior years. We also averaged data over preceding and succeeding years to fill in missing 
data for specific years. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the variables in the survival 
analysis. The average variance inflation factor (VIF) for all covariates was 1.75 and the VIFs for 
individual variables were well below the commonly used cutoff value of 10. This suggests that our 
analysis is not susceptible to multicollinearity (Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 presents the survival analysis results. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes all 
control variables. Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1 by adding the host country corporate income tax rate 
(HCCITR) variable.  Model 3 is the first stage 2SLS regression and Model 4 tests Hypothesis 1 using the 
fitted (predicted) value of HCCITR from the first stage. Model 2 and Model 4 results are remarkably 
consistent in terms of the directionality and size of the coefficients for HCCITR and other variables. A 
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propensity matching procedure (see Robustness Check section that follows) further allays 
endogeneity/self-selection concerns. Hence, we chose to retain Model 2 as our main specification. Doing 
so also enables us to compare explained variance (e.g., R-square) with Model 1, since the estimate of 
HCCITR used in Model 4, does not facilitate a meaningful comparison. The change in Chi-square from 
Model 1 to Model 2 is significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that Model 2, which includes HCCITR 
significantly adds explanatory variance to Model 1. An R-squared type measure of explained variation 
(R2d3) applicable to Cox regression (Royston, 2006), computes to 0.222 for Model 1 and 0.274 for Model 
2, indicating that HCCITR accounts for about 5% of the variance in subsidiary survival/exit. Model 2 
results support Hypothesis 1 and show that a subsidiary operating in a country with a lower CITR is more 
likely to survive (or less likely to exit) than its counterpart operating in a country with a higher CITR 
(HCCITR: p  < 0.001, β is positive). The hazard ratio (HR = 1.33) suggests that a one standard deviation 
(i.e. 7.7%) decrease in HCCITR increases subsidiary survival likelihood (at any given time), by 33% 
(1.33-1 = 0.33), or decreases subsidiary exit likelihood by 33%.  
Robustness Checks 
Endogeneity. To further alleviate  self-selection bias concerns, we also employed propensity 
score matching (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) to identify counterfactual cases of 
matching subsidiaries and obtain a "quasi-experimental" randomized sample. We identified high 
corporate income tax rate (CITR) host locations (treatment group) and low CITR host locations (control 
group) based on the median tax rate. Following Getachew and Beamish (2017), we formed matched 
groups of subsidiaries by estimating propensity scores across the following covariates: subsidiary age, 
subsidiary size, parent size, and parent equity ownership.  A t-test of means for each covariate by group 
indicated no statistically significant differences, suggesting that our matching procedure is sound. We 
identified 5,207 treatment and 3,427 control subsidiaries (a total of 8,634); and since the full sample 
comprises 13,468 subsidiaries, these numbers are reasonably representative. The results (treatment 
effects) for the matched sample are significantly and directionally robust with the full sample, hence 
allaying self-selection/ endogeneity concerns. 
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Profitability. We contend that poor financial performance may not translate to subsidiary exit if 
there are transfer pricing/debt shifting/intangible asset shifting advantages to low-tax locations. Research 
has indeed shown that foreign subsidiary survival and profitability are correlated, yet distinct, and may 
have different antecedents (Delios & Beamish, 2001). To ascertain the robustness of the tax effect while 
controlling for financial performance, we included subsidiary profitability as an additional control 
variable. We used a three-level measure, with profitability coded as either “profitable” (3), “break-even” 
(2), or “unprofitable” (1), based on TK survey data, which requests subsidiary managers to categorize 
annual financial profitability. This measure has been used repeatedly in numerous studies (e.g., Fang et 
al., 2013; Makino & Delios, 1996), and its content validity has been established (Isobe, Makino, & 
Montgomery, 2000). Due to missing profitability data, inclusion of this variable reduced the sample to 
6,383 subsidiaries. We found that while lower profitability increases the likelihood of subsidiary exit, the 
effect of host country corporate income tax rate (HCCITR) on survival/exit with the smaller sample 
remains significant, substantive, and directionally consistent with the full sample.  
Tax havens.  We sought to also differentiate between subsidiaries that engage in actual economic 
activity and those set-up in “tax havens” for profit shifting purposes. Using a list of 52 tax haven 
countries (Hines, 2010), we found that less than 12% of the subsidiaries in our sample are located in these 
countries. Excluding these observations did not alter the effect (size or significance) of HCCITR on 
subsidiary survival. Table 3 lists the percentage of sample subsidiaries by country with tax havens 
highlighted. 
Country fixed effects. We attempted to add fixed effects by country to our regression model. 
However doing so resulted in the omission of Cultural Distance, since this measure is also time-invariant 
(by country) and hence perfectly collinear with country fixed effects. Regression with country fixed 
effects absent Cultural Distance provided results consistent with our original model. Hence, we present 
results by retaining Cultural Distance (rather than country fixed effects). 
Collinearity. Table 1 indicates that the control variables host country size (GDP) and host country 
governance are strongly correlated (0.83). These variables are conceptually distinct; their standard errors 
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and VIFs do not show substantial evidence of collinearity; and research suggests that even if it exists, 
collinearity between control variables may be ignored (Allison, 2012; Nielsen & Raswant, 2018). 
Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we tested our hypothesis by excluding one of them (but including the 
other) in the regression model. In the absence of host country size, the effect of host country governance 
is consistent, however when the latter was excluded, the effect of host country size becomes significant. 
In either case, the effects of other variables, including the independent variable of interest (HCCITR) 
remain consistent with the full model. We did a similar check with host country debt to GDP and host 
country size (correlation 0.47), since they are mathematically related. Excluding either of them did not 
alter their individual effects or the effects of other variables in the regression model. 
Subsidiary size. Subsidiaries with few employees may be just agencies or sales offices or profit 
shifting channels, rather than viable subsidiary organizations engaging in substantial economic activity 
(Beamish & Inkpen, 1998). As a robustness check, we tested the hypothesis after excluding subsidiaries 
with less than 20 employees. The results with the reduced sample (9,213 subsidiaries) are consistent with 
the full sample. 
Parent equity ownership. While we excluded subsidiaries in which the Japanese parent owns less 
than 10% equity, a more conservative threshold to ascertain if the MNE exerts sufficient influence is 20% 
(Choi & Beamish, 2004; FASB, 1999). Increasing the minimum equity level to 20% reduced sample size 
(to 13,209 subsidiaries) but the results remain robust.    
DISCUSSION 
This research note aims to rectify the omission of host country corporate income tax rate 
(HCCITR) from foreign subsidiary survival analysis. We explain why HCCITR is critical to FDI 
decisions and outcomes and how (lower) HCCITRs may be considered a country specific-advantage.  We 
suggest that lower HCCITR improves subsidiary survival prospects since it reduces tax burden and 
improves post-tax profitability – which research has found to be correlated with subsidiary survival (e.g., 
Delios & Beamish, 2001; Gaur & Lu, 2007). Additionally, we argue that all else being equal, MNEs may 
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be less likely to terminate (poor performing) subsidiaries in host countries with lower CITRs, since they 
may aid profit shifting between subsidiaries leading to an increase in overall MNE profitability.  
Our intention was first to examine if HCCITR significantly affects foreign subsidiary 
survival/exit and second to compare its effect size to other explanatory variables such as cultural distance, 
MNE size, subsidiary size, and host country GDP growth, that are consistently used in subsidiary survival 
analysis literature. Based on prior reviews and meta-analyses (Bai et al., 2018; Nguyen, 2011), our model 
also included other known effects regularly controlled for in foreign subsidiary performance/survival 
analysis. Using a large longitudinal sample of over 13,000 unique subsidiaries, we find a significant and 
substantial effect of HCCITR – a one standard deviation (SD) decrease in HCCITR (7.7%) increases 
subsidiary survival likelihood (at any given time) by 33%. This effect is relatively stronger compared to 
several consistently used variables in subsidiary survival analysis. These include home to host country 
cultural distance – one SD decrease corresponds to a 5% increase in survival likelihood; MNE size 
(Parent Employees) – one SD decrease corresponds to a 14% increase in survival likelihood; subsidiary 
size (subsidiary employees) – insignificant; and host country GDP growth rate – insignificant.  
Contributions 
This paper (re)introduces international corporate taxes as an important yet understudied factor in 
MNE decisions. It empirically demonstrates the significant and substantive effect of host country 
corporate income tax rate (HCCITR) on foreign subsidiary survival. There is little integrative research 
across the fields of finance and IB, despite strong benefits (Puck & Filatotchev, 2018), and our study 
helps progress such cross-disciplinary research. Although international corporate income tax decisions are 
at the heart of global strategy and FDI location decisions, most research in the area is being published in 
finance, accounting, and economics journals, and rarely finds its way into IB and strategy journals 
(Nebus, 2016). Further, while such extant literature is focused on FDI location choice and impact on 
government tax policies (Clausing, 2009), our work relates to FDI outcomes and informs IB theory on 
location/country-specific advantages (LSAs/CSAs) (Dunning, 1998; Rugman, 1981, 2010). Empirically, 
this paper provides a pertinent example of a theoretically important and empirically/statistically 
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significant control variable HCCITR, which has been missing from most IB performance/survival 
analysis studies. As Nielsen and Raswant (2018) point out, inclusion of such variables are critical to avoid 
errors of omission and bias in IB research, which is particularly sensitive to the omitted variable problem 
due to the complexity of spanning multiple environmental contexts.  Hence, as a starting point, we 
suggest that HCCITR be consistently used as a control variable in future IB survival/performance analysis 
research and results from our exploratory study provide a large sample baseline to inform such research. 
Future Research Avenues 
In this research note, our intent is to highlight the importance of an understudied variable i.e., 
HCCITR to MNE strategic decisions and hence we consider a single hypothesis regarding the HCCITR to 
subsidiary survival relationship. In the context of the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1988; 1992), we also 
recognize and control for several MNE-level ownership advantages that are known to impact subsidiary 
survival. Future research may theoretically consider and empirically examine if/how some of these 
(control variables) may moderate the relationship between HCCITR and subsidiary survival. For instance, 
high-performing MNEs may be less likely to restructure their subsidiary portfolio (Hoskisson & Turk, 
1990) and hence MNE performance may positively moderate the (low) HCCITR to subsidiary survival 
relationship .  On the other hand, MNEs with greater operating scale across foreign countries have more 
options to alter subsidiary operations (Chung et al., 2010), and hence MNE international experience may 
negatively moderate the above relationship. 
Another aspect of ownership advantages that can aid further research entails governance across 
an MNE's network of foreign subsidiaries that can improve organizational effectiveness (Dunning, 1988; 
Lundan, 2009). In regard to MNE governance across its subsidiary network, much research has advocated 
for MNE regional strategies and the corresponding utilization of regional headquarters (RHQs) (e.g., 
Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter, & Beamish, 2017; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Verbeke & Asmussen, 
2016). Since RHQs govern a smaller number of (regional) subsidiaries, and are more embedded in these 
geographic regions, they are arguably more effective at monitoring, controlling, and aligning the goals of 
these subsidiaries with their MNE parents than Corporate HQ. Consequently, RHQs are also empowered 
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to make strategic decisions specific to subsidiaries under their jurisdiction, including reallocating 
resources, expanding, downsizing, and termination. (Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012; Maskell, Bathelt, & 
Malmberg, 2006). Hence, the presence or absence of RHQ governance may moderate the relationship 
between HCCITR  and subsidiary survival. For instance, an RHQ may be able to better balance subsidiary 
termination in one country due to poor performance and high HCCITR with increased investment in 
another country that has lower HCCITR and better performance.  
In terms of subsidiary-level contingencies an interesting future research area is the relative scope 
or influence within the MNE of a subsidiary's operational mandate/portfolio. While this paper controls for  
a subsidiary's investment purpose diversity (i.e., efficiency, resource, market, and capital-seeking), it 
would be interesting to examine how operational diversity in relation to same parent subsidiaries affects 
the relationship between HCCITR and subsidiary survival. For instance, a subsidiary that (relative to 
other "sister" subsidiaries) takes on a more diverse role in an MNE's global value chain activities may be 
more likely to survive in high HCCITR countries, given its greater relative value within the MNE 
network (Ambos, Andersson & Birkinshaw, 2010; Lee, Chung, & Beamish, 2019). Hence, greater 
relative subsidiary scope could positively moderate the relationship between (low) HCCITR and 
subsidiary survival.  
Limitations 
We acknowledge several limitations in our study. One limitation is that we do not distinguish 
between subsidiaries that generate revenue and corresponding sales income versus others with no direct 
connection to revenue/sales. The latter may comprise “pure” manufacturing subsidiaries with sales that 
take place outside of the host country; or intermediate goods supply entities. In such cases, our 
assumption is that the HCCITR applies to MNE income that is reasonably attributable to non-revenue 
operations arising from the focal subsidiary. However, we acknowledge this may not necessarily or 
consistently apply across various tax jurisdictions. Future work may therefore seek to distinguish between 
revenue and non-revenue generating subsidiaries.  
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A second limitation arises from the lack of consideration of sub-national variation in corporate 
income tax for foreign subsidiaries within a host country. Applicable taxes vary based on subsidiary 
location within cities, provinces, states or specific economic zones, since sub-national regions do compete 
with each other to attract FDI (Wei, 2012). Hence examining sub-national survival/performance variation 
based on differential tax rates may be another promising area for future research.  
Another limitation arises from the use of secondary data to conduct survival analysis based on the 
absence (exit) of the focal subsidiary in the database. We do not distinguish between a subsidiary going 
out of business due to market failure and an MNE level decision to terminate the subsidiary even if it can 
viably continue, as this distinction is impossible to empirically establish from our dataset. That said, this 
method of conducting survival analysis has long been established in the extant literature (e.g., Amezcua et 
al., 2013; Chung & Beamish, 2005; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Lu & Ma, 2008). 
Our work is also limited by the fact that HCCITR is a statutory tax rate and does not account for 
country-specific depreciation allowances and interest deductions, or specific bi-lateral or multilateral tax 
rules (e.g., tax treaties between countries), tax breaks, exemptions, or credits. While statutory tax rates are 
highly correlated with actual tax rates (Clausing, 2009), they may not be the perfect proxy for actual tax 
rates firms pay. Future research may consider the use of a composite index such as the “Tax 
Attractiveness Index” developed by Keller & Shanz (2013) or government debt-to-GDP ratio as a proxy 
for tax competitiveness (Gan & Qiu, 2019). That said, given the strong correlations (of statutory with 
effective tax rates), the results are likely to remain consistent with effective tax rates. Further, the 
HCCITR effect on subsidiary survival remained significant, substantive, and  directionally consistent after 
controlling for the Debt to GDP ratio in our regression model to account for other factors that statutory 
corporate tax rates may overlook, as suggested by Gan & Qiu (2019). 
Our findings may have limited generalizability since they are based on a sample of Japanese 
MNEs and their subsidiaries. Tax management practices and corresponding FDI decisions may differ 
between MNEs from different countries of origin. Japanese MNEs generally repatriate profits back to 
Japan (e.g., through dividends, royalties, management charges, and transfer pricing) on a much larger 
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scale than their US counterparts. For instance, Tajika and Nakatani’s (2008) findings indicate that about 
44% of Japanese foreign subsidiaries repatriate dividends versus about 16% of US foreign subsidiaries. 
This is surprising since the corporate tax rate has been historically high in Japan – averaging about 42% 
over the last three decades (although it dropped to about 31% in 2015 and has remained at that level 
since). This profit repatriation phenomenon has led several researchers to suggest that Japanese MNEs 
lack sophisticated tax management practices; that they operate as a single entity driven by the need to 
centralize profit at home; and that they engage in opportunistic transfer pricing to inflate home country 
profit (e.g., Buckley & Hughes, 2001; Eden, Valdez, & Li, 2005). The actual reasons notwithstanding, 
foreign tax rates may matter less to Japanese MNEs relative to MNEs from other countries of origin. For 
instance, research suggests that tax haven countries receive much larger capital inflows from the US, UK, 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands, than they do from Japan (Hines, 2010). Hence, the results from 
our hypothesis test examining the effect of HCCITR on Japanese subsidiary survival may in-fact be 
conservative. We expect the effect to be larger for MNEs that pay a relatively greater share of their 
corporate taxes in host countries (e.g., US MNEs), and we call for research to investigate the same. 
Finally, while our study focuses on foreign subsidiaries physically located in host countries, it is 
worth noting and examining the rise of digital MNEs, given emerging IB attention to the subject (e.g., 
Stallkamp & Schotter, 2019). The digital nature of these businesses may make profit shifting much easier 
(Fuest, Parenti, & Toubal, 2019) and thus further strengthen the relationship between HCCITR and the 
survival of foreign subsidiaries which play a key role in intangible asset shifting. Littlewood (2020) notes 
that digital MNEs such as Facebook, Google, and Uber derive large profits from numerous countries 
despite hardly paying any taxes (either because their physical establishment is small/non-existent or 
because most of the profit is attributable to IP owned by subsidiaries in other countries). On the other 
hand, backlash from affected governments and tax reform may lead to changes in how these businesses 
orchestrate international operations. For instance, as an interim measure pending international tax reform, 
several countries have announced plans to impose a digital services tax on gross turnover attributable to 
the host country. 
21 
Implications for Managers and Policymakers 
IB academics are the principal audience for this paper - since too much scholarly work has 
ignored country tax rates. MNE managers have long understood that host country tax considerations are 
critical in making global strategic decisions. Nonetheless, there are several points which may be relevant 
to MNE managers. The first is that not only do low host country tax rates incentivize FDI, they are also 
far more important to subsidiary survival than several other variables that have been deemed traditionally 
important such as Cultural Distance, MNE International Experience, MNE Size, and Subsidiary Size. A 
second is our finding that the directional pattern (significance and substantiveness) of our results remains 
largely the same, irrespective of whether the country is a “tax haven” or not. Establishing a foreign 
subsidiary is capital intensive and entails considerable strategic and operational effort, and therefore 
subsidiary termination is often an option of last resort. Hence, our study may help MNE managers better 
assess the relative importance of corporate tax rates vis a vis other variables and host-country incentives 
in making FDI decisions.  Policy makers should also note how critical (low) host country tax rates are to 
retaining foreign direct investment. We are not suggesting that governments lower their corporate tax 
rates, however they should very carefully consider the consequences of raising them. 
  NOTES 
1Based on 2018 impact factors, these are: Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of World 
Business, International Business Review, Journal of International Management, Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, Global Strategy Journal, Management International Review, and Management and 
Organization Review. 
 
2Subsidiary Diversity = iPi*ln(1/Pi), where Pi is the fraction of investment purposes corresponding to 
category i. 
 
3R2d is a measure of variance explained by independent variables (IVs). It excludes categorical IVs in its 
computation, which for our model are Parent and Subsidiary Industry Sectors. The categorical nature of 
the dependent variable is immaterial.  
22 
REFERENCES 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. London: Sage. 
Allison, P. (2012, September 10). When can you safely ignore multicollinearity. Retrieved from http:// 
www.statisticalhorizons.com/multicollinearity 
Ambos, T. C., Andersson, U., & Birkinshaw, J. (2010). What are the consequences of initiative-taking in 
multinational subsidiaries? Journal of International Business Studies, 41(7): 1099-1118. 
Amezcua, A. S., Grimes, M. G., Bradley, S. W., & Wiklund, J. (2013). Organizational sponsorship and founding 
environments: A contingency view on the survival of business-incubated firms, 1994–2007. Academy of 
Management Journal, 56(6): 1628-1654. 
Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., & Larcker, D. F. (2012). The incentives for tax planning. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 53(1): 391-411.  
Arregle, J. L., Beamish, P. W., & Hébert, L. (2009). The regional dimension of MNEs' foreign subsidiary 
localization. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(1): 86-107. 
Avi-Yonah, R. S., & Lahav, Y. (2012). The effective tax rates of the largest U.S. and EU multinationals. Tax 
Law Review, 65: 375-389.  
Bai, T., Du, J., & Solarino, A. M. (2018). Performance of foreign subsidiaries “in” and “from” Asia: A review, 
synthesis and research agenda. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 35(3): 607-638.  
Bauer, Matthias (2018). Digital companies and their fair share of taxes: Myths and misconceptions. ECIPE 
Occasional Paper, No. 03/2018, European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), Brussels 
Benito, G. R. (2005). Divestment and international business strategy. Journal of Economic Geography, 5(2): 
235-251. 
Beamish, P. W., & Inkpen, A. C. (1998). Japanese firms and the decline of the Japanese expatriate. Journal of 
World Business, 33(1): 35-50. 
Brajcich, A., Friesner, D., & Schibik, T. (2016). Do US pharmaceutical companies strategically shift income to 
international affiliates? Multinational Business Review, 24(1): 8-24.  
Brouthers, K. D. (2002). Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode choice and 
performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2): 203-221. 
Buckley, P. J., & Hughes, J. F. (2001). Incentives to transfer profits: a Japanese perspective. Applied 
Economics, 33(15): 2009-2015. 
Chakravarty, D., Hsieh, Y. Y., Schotter, A. P., & Beamish, P. W. (2017). Multinational enterprise regional 
management centres: Characteristics and performance. Journal of World Business, 52(2): 296-311. 
Choi, C. B., & Beamish, P. W. (2004). Split management control and international joint venture 
performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(3): 201-215. 
Christmann, P., Day, D., & Yip, G. S. (1999). The relative influence of country conditions, industry structure, 
and business strategy on multinational corporation subsidiary performance. Journal of International 
Management, 5(4): 241-265.  
Chung, C. C., Lu, J. W., & Beamish, P. W. (2008). Multinational networks during times of economic crisis 
versus stability. Management International Review, 48(3): 279-296. 
Clausing, K. A. (2009). Multinational firm tax avoidance and tax policy. National Tax Journal, LXII(4): 703-
725. 
Contractor, F. J. (2016). Tax avoidance by multinational companies: Methods, policies, and ethics. AIB Insights, 
16(2): 10-13. 
De Mooij, R., & Ederveen, S. (2003). Taxation and foreign direct investment: A synthesis of empirical research. 
International Tax and Public Finance, 10(6): 673-693.  
De Simone, L., Klassen, K. J., & Seidman, J. K. (2017). Unprofitable affiliates and income shifting behavior. 
The Accounting Review, 92(3): 113-136. 
Dehejia, R. H., & Wahba, S. (2002). Propensity score-matching methods for nonexperimental causal studies. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1): 151-161.  
Delios, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2001). Survival and profitability: The roles of experience and intangible assets 
in foreign subsidiary performance. Academy of Management Journal, 44(5): 1028-1038. 
Delios, A., & Makino, S. (2003). Timing of entry and the foreign subsidiary performance of Japanese firms. 
Journal of International Marketing, 11(3): 83-105. 
23 
Dellestrand, H., & Kappen, P. (2012). The effects of spatial and contextual factors on headquarters resource 
allocation to MNE subsidiaries. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(3): 219-243. 
Delmar, F., McKelvie, A., & Wennberg, K. (2013). Untangling the relationships among growth, profitability 
and survival in new firms. Technovation, 33(8-9): 276-291. 
Demirbag, M., Apaydin, M., & Tatoglu, E. (2011). Survival of Japanese subsidiaries in the middle east and 
North Africa. Journal of World Business, 46(4), 411-425. 
Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2009). Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 91(3): 537-546. 
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., & Hines Jr, J. R. (2004a). A multinational perspective on capital structure choice and 
internal capital markets. Journal of Finance, 59(6): 2451-2487. 
Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F., & Hines Jr, J. R. (2004b). The costs of shared ownership: Evidence from international 
joint ventures. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2): 323-374. 
Dhanaraj, C., & Beamish, P. W. (2004). Effect of equity ownership on the survival of international joint ventures. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25(3): 295-305. 
Dhanaraj, C., & Beamish, P. W. (2009). Institutional environment and subsidiary survival. Management 
International Review, 49(3): 291-312. 
Dharmapala, D. (2014). What do we know about base erosion and profit shifting? A review of the empirical 
literature. Fiscal Studies, 35(4): 421-448. 
Dischinger, M., & Riedel, N. (2011). Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational 
firms. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7): 691-707.  
Dunning, J. H. 1988. The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement and some possible 
extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19(1): 1-31. 
Dunning, J. H. 1992. Transatlantic foreign direct investment and the European Economic Community. 
International Economic Journal, 6(1): 59-82. 
Dunning, J. H. (1998). Location and the multinational enterprise: A neglected factor? Journal of International 
Business Studies, 29(1): 45-66.  
Dunning, J. H. (2000). The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories of MNE 
activity. International Business Review, 9(2): 163-190. 
Dunning, J. H. (2001). The eclectic (OLI) paradigm of international production: Past, present and future. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 8(2): 173-190. 
Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2008). Institutions and the OLI paradigm of the multinational enterprise. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 25(4): 573-593. 
Eden, L., Valdez, L. F. J., & Li, D. (2005). Talk softly but carry a big stick: Transfer pricing penalties and the 
market valuation of Japanese multinationals in the United States. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 36(4): 398-414.  
Egger, P., & Merlo, V. (2011). Statutory corporate tax rates and double-taxation treaties as determinants of 
multinational firm activity. FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis, 67(2): 145-170. 
Esteller-Moré, A., Rizzo, L., & Secomandi, R. (2020). The heterogenous impact of taxation on FDI: A note on 
Djankov et al.(2010). Economics Letters, 186, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108775. 
Fang, Y., Wade, M., Delios, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2013). An exploration of multinational enterprise 
knowledge resources and foreign subsidiary performance. Journal of World Business, 48(1): 30-38. 
FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board). (1999). Reporting interests in joint ventures and other similar 
arrangements: Special report. Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Foundation. 
Feeny, S., & McGillivray, M. (2010). Aid and growth in small island developing states. Journal of Development 
Studies, 46(5): 897-917. 
Fuest, C., Parenti, M., Toubal, F. (2019). Fiscalité internationale des entreprises : quelles réformes pour quels 
effets ? Notes du Conseil d’Analyse Economique, 6 (54): 1-12 
Gan, Y., & Qiu, B. 2019. Escape from the USA: Government debt-to-GDP ratio, country tax competitiveness, 
and US-OECD cross-border M&As. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(7): 1156-1183. 
Gaur, A. S., Delios, A., & Singh, K. (2007). Institutional environments, staffing strategies, and subsidiary 
performance. Journal of Management, 33(4): 611-636. 
Gaur, A. S., & Lu, J. W. (2007). Ownership strategies and survival of foreign subsidiaries: Impacts of 
institutional distance and experience. Journal of Management, 33(1): 84-110. 
24 
Getachew, Y. S., & Beamish, P. W. (2017). Foreign subsidiary exit from Africa: The effects of investment 
purpose diversity and orientation. Global Strategy Journal, 7(1): 58-82. 
Gokalp, O. N., Lee, S.-H., & Peng, M. W. (2017). Competition and corporate tax evasion: An institution-based 
view. Journal of World Business, 52(2): 258-269. 
Gong, Y. (2006). The impact of subsidiary top management team national diversity on subsidiary performance: 
Knowledge and legitimacy perspectives. Management International Review, 46(6): 771-790. 
Heckemeyer, J. H., & Overesch, M. (2017). Multinationals’ profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and 
shifting channels. Canadian Journal of Economics, 50(4): 965-994. 
Hines Jr, J. R. (2010). Treasure islands. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4), 103-26. 
Hoffman, R. C., Munemo, J., & Watson, S. (2016). International franchise expansion: The role of institutions 
and transaction costs. Journal of International Management, 22(2): 101-114. 
Hoskisson, R. E., & Turk, T. A. (1990). Corporate restructuring: Governance and control limits of the internal 
capital market. Academy of Management Review, 15(3): 459-477. 
Isobe, T., Makino, S., & Montgomery, D. B. (2000). Resource commitment, entry timing, and market 
performance of foreign direct investments in emerging economies: The case of Japanese international 
joint ventures in China. Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 468-484. 
Jones, C., & Temouri, Y. (2016). The determinants of tax haven FDI. Journal of World Business, 51(2): 237-
250.  
Keller, S. & Schanz, D. (2013). Measuring tax attractiveness across countries. Arqus - Working Paper No. 143. 
Available at: http://www.arqus.info/mobile/paper/arqus_143.pdf. 
Kim, Y. C., Lu, J. W., & Rhee, M. (2012). Learning from age difference: Interorganizational learning and 
survival in Japanese foreign subsidiaries. Journal of International Business Studies, 43(8): 719-745. 
Klassen, K. J., Lisowsky, P., & Mescall, D. (2017). Transfer pricing: Strategies, practices, and tax minimization. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1): 455-493. 
Kleinbaum, D., & Klein, M. (2005). Survival analysis: A self-learning text. NY: Springer. 
Kogut, B., & Singh, H. (1988). The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 19(3): 411-432. 
Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C., & Neter, J. (2004). Applied linear regression models: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Lee, H., Chung, C. C., & Beamish, P. W. (2019). Configurational characteristics of mandate 
portfolios and their impact on foreign subsidiary survival. Journal of World Business, 54(5), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2019.100999. 
Lin, C.-W., & Chang, H.-C. (2010). Motives of transfer pricing strategies–systemic analysis. Industrial 
Management & Data Systems, 110(8): 1215-1233.  
Littlewood, M. (2020).  Taxing Highly Digitalised Firms: The OECD and New Zealand's Proposed Digital 
Services Tax (September 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692899 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3692899 
Lu, J. W., & Beamish, P. W. (2004). International diversification and firm performance: The S-curve 
hypothesis. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4): 598-609. 
Lu, J. W., & Hebert, L. (2005). Equity control and the survival of international joint ventures: a contingency 
approach. Journal of Business Research, 58(6): 736-745. 
Lu, J. W., & Ma, X. (2008). The contingent value of local partners' business group affiliations. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51(2): 295-214. 
Lu, J. W., & Xu, D. (2006). Growth and survival of international joint ventures: An external-internal legitimacy 
perspective. Journal of Management, 32(3): 426-448. 
Lundan, S. M. (2010). What are ownership advantages? The Multinational Business Review, 18(2): 51-69. 
Luo, Y., Shenkar, O., & Nyaw, M. K. (2001). A dual parent perspective on control and performance in 
international joint ventures: Lessons from a developing economy. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 32(1): 41-58. 
Makino, S., Beamish, P. W., & Zhao, N. B. (2004). The characteristics and performance of Japanese FDI in less 
developed and developed countries. Journal of World Business, 39(4): 377-392. 
Makino, S., & Delios, A. (1996). Local knowledge transfer and performance: Implications for alliance 
formation in Asia. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(5): 905-927. 
25 
Makino, S., Isobe, T., & Chan, C. M. (2004). Does country matter? Strategic Management Journal, 25(10): 
1027-1043. 
Maskell, P., Bathelt, H., & Malmberg, A. (2006). Building global knowledge pipelines: The role of temporary 
clusters. European Planning Studies, 14(8), 997-1013. 
Minnick, K., & Noga, T. (2010). Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management? Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 16(5): 703-718. 
Nebus, J. (2016). Irish-Dutch sandwiches, corporate inversions, and arm's length transactions: International tax 
for IB courses. AIB Insights, 16(2): 14-18.  
Nguyen, Q. T. (2011). The empirical literature on multinational enterprises, subsidiaries and 
performance. Multinational Business Review, 19(1): 47-64. 
Nielsen, B. B., & Raswant, A. (2018). The selection, use, and reporting of control variables in international 
business research: A review and recommendations. Journal of World Business, 53(6): 958-968. 
Oxelheim, L., Randøy, T., & Stonehill, A. (2001). On the treatment of finance-specific factors within the OLI 
paradigm. International Business Review, 10(4): 381-398.  
Plourde, Y., Parker, S. C., & Schaan, J. L. (2014). Expatriation and its effect on headquarters' attention in the 
multinational enterprise. Strategic Management Journal, 35(6): 938-947. 
Puck, J., & Filatotchev, I. (2018). Finance and the multinational company: Building bridges between finance 
and global strategy research. Global Strategy Journal. https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1330. 
Riedel, N. (2018). Quantifying international tax avoidance: A review of the academic literature. Review of 
Economics, 69(2): 169-181. 
Robinson, J. R., Sikes, S. A., & Weaver, C. D. (2010). Performance measurement of corporate tax departments. 
The Accounting Review, 85(3): 1035-1064. 
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for 
causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1): 41-55.  
Royston, P. (2006). Explained variation for survival models. The Stata Journal, 6(1): 83-96. 
Rugman, A. M. (1981). Inside the multinationals: The economics of international markets. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Rugman, A. M. (2010). Reconciling internalization theory and the eclectic paradigm. Multinational Business 
Review, 18(2): 1-12.  
Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. (2004). A perspective on regional and global strategies of multinational 
enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(1): 3-18. 
Sayek, S. (2009). Foreign direct investment and inflation. Southern Economic Journal, 76(2): 419-443. 
Schanz, D., Dinkel, A., & Keller, S. (2017). Tax attractiveness and the location of German-controlled 
subsidiaries. Review of Managerial Science, 11(1): 251-297. 
Schjelderup, G. (2016). The tax sensitivity of debt in multinationals: A review. International Journal of the 
Economics of Business, 23(1): 109-121.  
Semuels, A. (2016, October 20). Would cutting corporate tax rates really grow the economy? The Atlantic. 
Retrieved September 15, 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/would-
cutting-corporate-tax-rates-really-grow-the-economy/504845/.  
Stallkamp, M., & Schotter, A. P. 2019. Platforms without borders? The international strategies of digital 
platform firms. Global Strategy Journal. https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1336. 
Tajika, E., & Nakatani, R. (2008). Welcome Home to Japan: Repatriation of Foreign Profits by Japanese 
Multinationals. Hitotsubashi University - Discussion Paper No. 2008-04. Available at http://hermes-
ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/16994/1/070econDP08-04.pdf 
Tang, J., & Rowe, W. G. (2012). The liability of closeness: Business relatedness and foreign subsidiary 
performance. Journal of World Business, 47(2): 288-296.  
Tchetgen, E. J. T., Walter, S., Vansteelandt, S., Martinussen, T., & Glymour, M. (2015). Instrumental variable 
estimation in a survival context. Epidemiology (Cambridge, Mass.), 26(3), 402-410. 
Verbeke, A., & Asmussen, C. G. (2016). Global, local, or regional? The locus of MNE strategies. Journal of 
Management Studies, 53(6): 1051-1075. 
Wei, Y. H. D. 2012. Restructuring for growth in urban China: Transitional institutions, urban development, 
and spatial transformation. Habitat International, 36(3): 396-405. 
26 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
  Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Subsidiary Exit 0.03 0.17 1         
2 Host Country Corp. Income Tax Rate 31.69 7.66 0.024 1        
3 Subsidiary Age 12.74 10.35 -0.022 -0.033 1       
4 Subsidiary Employees 222.35 862.37 -0.018 -0.017 0.092 1      
5 Expatriate Number 4.44 9.33 -0.045 0.056 0.125 0.243 1     
6 Subsidiary Diversity 0.1 0.19 -0.009 -0.024 -0.019 0.014 0.012 1    
7 Parent Employees 18661.74 39214.6 0.021 0.015 0.080 0.184 0.185 -0.039 1   
8 Parent Return on Assets 3.56 5.98 -0.017 -0.058 0.013 0.008 -0.021 -0.011 -0.037 1  
9 Parent Equity Ownership 80.73 26.47 -0.040 0.027 0.050 -0.058 0.097 -0.003 -0.039 0.052 1 
10 Parent International Experience 0.13 0.15 0.042 0.028 0.091 0.036 0.092 -0.054 0.466 -0.058 -0.136 
11 Host Country Size 19217.45 16320.1 0.029 0.192 0.280 -0.072 0.036 -0.039 -0.004 0.030 0.315 
12 Host Country GDP Growth Rate 3.48 4.09 -0.016 -0.184 -0.199 0.032 -0.026 0.023 -0.018 0.033 -0.092 
13 Host Country Inflation Rate 3.55 5.75 -0.010 0.018 -0.066 0.039 -0.007 0.005 0.028 -0.019 -0.100 
14 Host Country Debt to GDP 49.68 27.18 0.012 0.321 0.200 -0.029 0.021 -0.019 0.018 0.028 0.137 
15 Host Country Soc. Prot. Exp. to GDP 11.16 8.65 0.026 0.514 0.149 -0.059 0.012 -0.060 0.039 0.004 0.237 
16 Cultural Distance 4.01 1.19 0.011 -0.093 0.081 0.001 0.041 -0.004 -0.010 -0.026 0.039 
17 Host Country Governance 0.64 0.9 0.039 0.236 0.204 -0.089 0.037 -0.047 -0.007 -0.033 0.289 
             
  Variable Mean SD 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  
10 Parent International Experience 0.13 0.15 1         
11 Host Country Size 19217.45 16320.1 0.032 1        
12 Host Country GDP Growth Rate 3.48 4.09 -0.084 -0.464 1       
13 Host Country Inflation Rate 3.55 5.75 0.053 -0.291 -0.029 1      
14 Debt to GDP 49.68 27.18 0.055 0.466 -0.386 -0.127 1     
15 Host Country Soc. Prot. Exp. to GDP 11.16 8.65 0.108 0.633 -0.392 -0.160 0.410 1    
16 Cultural Distance 4.01 1.19 -0.006 0.209 -0.195 -0.054 0.094 -0.174 1   
17 Host Country Governance 0.64 0.9 0.041 0.826 -0.519 -0.349 0.380 0.625 0.259 1  
             
Correlations greater than |0.007| are significant at the 5% confidence level.         
Number of: Observations (subsidiary-years) = 96,060; Subsidiaries = 13,468; Japanese parents (MNEs) = 1,712; Subsidiary exits = 2,924.   
Descriptive statistics are computed for actual (unstandardized) variable values; correlations are computed for standardized values.   




Table 2 Survival analysis results 
Explanatory Variables (1) Controls   (2) Hypothesis   (3) 2SLS-Stage 1   (4) 2SLS-Stage 2  
  β CRSE HR   β CRSE HR   β CRSE   β CRSE HR 
Host Country Corp. Inc. Tax Rt.     0.288*** 0.026 1.334        
Host Country Corp. Inc. Tax Rt. (Fitted)             0.255*** 0.045 1.291 
Host Country Soc. Prot. Exp. to GDP          0.697*** 0.017     
Subsidiary Age  0.050* 0.020 1.051   0.037† 0.020 1.037  -0.065*** 0.008   0.075** 0.022 1.078 
Subsidiary Employees  0.008 0.032 1.008   0.014 0.026 1.014  -0.015 0.011   0.009 0.035 1.009 
Expatriate Number -0.664*** 0.110 0.515  -0.689*** 0.110 0.502   0.054*** 0.008  -0.657*** 0.110 0.518 
Subsidiary Diversity -0.031 0.034 0.969  -0.016 0.034 0.984  -0.005 0.010  -0.020 0.034 0.980 
Subsidiary Sector (Manufacturing: Ref.)               
Subsidiary Sector (Trading) -0.259*** 0.058 0.772  -0.248*** 0.058 0.780  -0.018 0.018  -0.246*** 0.058 0.782 
Subsidiary Sector (Services & Others)  0.247** 0.078 1.280   0.259*** 0.072 1.296   0.059* 0.026   0.241** 0.081 1.273 
Parent Employees  0.136** 0.041 1.145   0.138*** 0.039 1.148   0.009 0.025   0.129** 0.044 1.138 
Parent Return on Assets -0.088** 0.030 0.916  -0.085** 0.031 0.919  -0.039*** 0.007  -0.079** 0.030 0.924 
Parent Equity Ownership -0.182*** 0.035 0.833  -0.174*** 0.033 0.840  -0.075*** 0.007  -0.151*** 0.031 0.860 
Parent International Experience  0.132* 0.055 1.141   0.128* 0.052 1.136  -0.060** 0.021   0.142* 0.057 1.153 
Parent Sector (Manufacturing: Ref.)               
Parent Sector (Trading)  0.224* 0.089 1.252   0.256** 0.088 1.292   0.015 0.025   0.277** 0.087 1.320 
Parent Sector (Services & Others) -0.137 0.116 0.872  -0.109 0.111 0.897  -0.102*** 0.027  -0.090 0.118 0.914 
Host Country Size -0.388*** 0.048 0.678  -0.494*** 0.048 0.610  -0.278*** 0.023  -0.386*** 0.048 0.680 
Host Country GDP Growth Rate  0.027 0.029 1.027   0.039 0.030 1.040  -0.002 0.007   0.036 0.030 1.036 
Host Country Inflation Rate  0.741 0.463 2.097   0.594 0.503 1.811   0.140 0.129   0.530 0.511 1.699 
Host Country Debt to GDP  0.071** 0.022 1.074  -0.017 0.026 0.983   0.261*** 0.009  -0.016 0.029 0.984 
Cultural Distance  0.053** 0.020 1.055   0.045* 0.018 1.046   0.035* 0.015   0.039* 0.019 1.040 
Host Country Governance  0.746*** 0.047 2.109   0.816*** 0.049 2.261  -0.036† 0.020   0.699*** 0.045 2.012 
Pseudo R-squared (R2d)      0.222  0.274        
Log-likelihood -25122.153  -25043.713        
Chi-square / d.f. 1261.632 / 18  1418.513 / 19        
Chi-square difference 156.881***        
† p  <  0.10,  * p  <  0.05,  ** p  <  0.01,  *** p  < 0.001.                         
Standardized variables used; β = Regression Coefficient, CRSE = Cluster Robust Standard Error, HR = Hazard Ratio.           
Number of: Observations (subsidiary-years) = 96,060; Subsidiaries = 13,468; MNEs = 1,712; Subsidiary exits = 2,924.      
R2d = R-squared type measure applicable to Cox regression (Royston, 2006), that excludes categorical independent variables. 
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Table 3 Percentage of sample subsidiaries by country (asterisks indicate tax havens) 
 
Country Subsidiary %  Country Subsidiary %  Country Subsidiary % 
Argentina 0.17  Hungary 0.27  Qatar 0.02 
Australia 2.39  India 1.71  Romania 0.08 
Austria 0.24  Indonesia 3.05  Russia 0.57 
Bahrain* 0.06  Iran 0.07  Saudi Arabia 0.13 
Bangladesh 0.07  Ireland* 0.23  Serbia and Montenegro 0.02 
Belgium 0.72  Israel 0.05  Singapore* 4.78 
Brazil 1.61  Italy 0.94  Slovak Republic 0.07 
Brunei 0.04  Jamaica 0.02  Slovenia 0.03 
Bulgaria 0.03  Kuwait 0.01  South Africa 0.21 
Canada 1.47  Laos 0.03  South Korea 3.10 
Chile 0.25  Luxembourg* 0.21  Spain 0.72 
China 19.09  Malaysia 3.29  Sri Lanka 0.12 
Colombia 0.11  Mexico 1.27  Sweden 0.36 
Costa Rica* 0.04  Morocco 0.03  Switzerland* 0.48 
Czech Republic 0.30  Netherlands 1.95  Taiwan 3.74 
Denmark 0.16  New Zealand 0.38  Tanzania 0.02 
Ecuador 0.04  Nigeria 0.09  Thailand 6.19 
Egypt 0.06  Norway 0.11  Trinidad and Tobago 0.01 
El Salvador 0.02  Oman 0.02  Turkey 0.21 
Ethiopia 0.01  Pakistan 0.09  UAE 0.28 
Finland 0.13  Panama* 0.80  UK 4.30 
France 2.02  Peru 0.10  Ukraine 0.05 
Germany 2.90  Philippines 1.76  USA 18.32 
Greece 0.06  Poland 0.32  Venezuela 0.12 
Honduras 0.01  Portugal 0.16  Vietnam 1.72 
Hong Kong* 5.31  Puerto Rico 0.06  Zambia 0.01 
 
 
